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Virtually all appellate courts are collegial (i.e., multimember) 
courts.  Students of judicial behavior (both political scientists and 
members of the legal academy), particularly those who view judicial 
choice through the lens of strategic behavior, have paid quite a bit of 
attention to this characteristic of appellate courts, .1  Of interest re-
cently have been the strategic implications of the panel decisionmak-
ing mechanism relied on by the U.S. courts of appeals.2  The courts of 
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1 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10 (1998) 
(exploring implications of the fact that “[J]ustices are strategic actors who realize that 
their ability to achieve their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of 
other actors”); FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, 
CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT 28 (2000) (“[W]e hope to show that . . . our 
model of strategic interaction robustly explains a wide range of choices made by 
[J]ustices of the Supreme Court.”). 
2 See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, 
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 73-88 (2006) (analyzing strategic behavior in circuit 
courts); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2158 (1998) 
(attempting to “explain and demonstrate empirically under what conditions appellate 
court judges . . . obey the legal doctrines the Supreme Court has set out”); Virginia A. 
Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Comparing Attitudinal and Stra-
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appeals decide most cases with the use of rotating, three-judge pa-
nels,3 but the decision of a panel is subject to two kinds of review:  re-
view by the circuit en banc and review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Presumably, a strategic member of a panel could attempt to signal to 
the circuit en banc or to the Supreme Court when, contrary to her 
preferences, the panel decision is at odds with circuit law or Supreme 
Court precedent.  The key, then, from a strategic perspective, is to 
understand how the ideological composition of a panel (relative to 
the circuit or relative to the Supreme Court) can induce strategic be-
havior on the part of an individual judge. 
This is precisely the task to which Professor Kim sets herself in De-
liberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:  An Empirical 
Exploration of Panel Effects.4  To do so, she uses the votes cast in Title VII 
sex discrimination cases decided with published opinions in the courts 
of appeals.5  Specifically, Professor Kim focuses on counter-ideological 
voting.6  The measurement strategy she takes is elegant; she defines 
counter-ideological voting as an instance in which a judge votes liber-
ally when she is expected, based on her ideological preferences, to 
vote conservatively, or vice versa.7  The use of this dependent variable 
is advantageous in that strategic accounts of judicial vote choice are 
explicitly about whether a judge modifies her behavior systematically 
in response to the anticipated actions of other relevant actors (e.g., 
the Supreme Court).8  This dependent variable is explicitly about 
change in anticipated behavior.  Moreover, Professor Kim’s empirical 
analyses are constructed to determine whether the likelihood of coun-
ter-ideological voting varies according to the alignment of a judge’s 
 
tegic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 
125 (2004) (discussing the “(non)use of dissents to induce (or prevent) en banc review 
by the circuit”); Steven R. Van Winkle, Dissent as a Signal:  Evidence from the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals 6-16 (Aug. 29, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) 
(proposing a model of strategic behavior based on imperfect commitment, informa-
tion asymmetry, and costly enforcement on the U.S. courts of appeals). 
3 See JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS 70-84 (2002) (de-
scribing the internal procedural rules governing appellate court review). 
4 Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals:  An 
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009). 
5 Id. at 1327. 
6 Id. at 1328. 
7 Id. 
8 Cf. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 1, at 12 (“To say that a [J]ustice acts strategi-
cally is to say that she realizes that her success or failure depends on the preferences of 
other actors and the actions she expects them to take, not just on her own preferences 
and actions.”). 
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preferences with those of her panel mates and, ultimately, either 
those of the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court.9  She concludes 
that judges do not anticipate the likely reactions of the Supreme 
Court but do bear in mind the likely reactions of the circuit en banc.10 
The evidence Professor Kim brings to bear is a welcome addition 
to the extant literature; however, what ultimately emerges from her 
analyses is a bit different than what she initially articulates as her 
avowed purpose.  Early in her article, Professor Kim asserts that her 
intention is to offer “an empirical test of two competing types of ex-
planations:  deliberative and strategic.”11  She describes deliberative 
explanations as “those theories that emphasize the internal exchanges 
that occur among panel members and the potential for these ex-
changes to influence a judge’s vote.”12  However, the subsequent tests, 
although empirically crisp and clear, are really tests of two competing 
strategic explanations for panel effects (i.e., strategy vis-à-vis the Su-
preme Court and strategy vis-à-vis the courts of appeals en banc) ra-
ther than a test of a strategic versus a deliberative theory of panel effects. 
While it is certainly fair to say that the empirical patterns Professor 
Kim finds are consistent with one strategic account of panel effects, 
they are also consonant with at least some versions of a deliberative 
account.  Professor Kim asserts that “if purely deliberative explana-
tions are true, the preferences of the Supreme Court or the circuit as 
a whole should have no systematic impact on whether or when panel 
effects are observed.”13  But a deliberative model where panel mem-
bers engage in an exchange of ideas and arguments can also lead to 
an observed pattern in which the preferences of the circuit en banc 
and the alignment of those preferences with the judges on a panel 
have an effect.  As Professor Kim observes, 
The individual appellate judge interacts with other judges on the same 
circuit on a regular basis—on other panel sittings, in the context of ad-
ministrative functions, and even casually in the halls of the court-
house. . . . Because of the routine, ongoing interactions among judges 
within a circuit, the views of their immediate colleagues will be far more 





9 Kim, supra note 4, at 1328. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1324. 
12 Id. at 1325. 
13 Id. at 1327. 
14 Id. at 1369 (footnote omitted). 
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Although Professor Kim points to this interaction among court of 
appeals judges as a possible explanation for why they are attentive to 
their circuit colleagues but not their Supreme Court superiors, this 
same interaction is at the root of the behavioral equivalence that un-
dermines the definitive interpretation of her empirical evidence as 
supporting a strategic account of panel effects.  A judge who is in the 
minority on a panel but in the majority on the circuit certainly may 
raise arguments in the panel deliberations that are intended to high-
light the threat of the panel decision being overturned by the circuit 
en banc.  But such a judge may also present arguments about circuit 
preferences (as embedded in circuit precedent) because they are the 
kind of arguments that will persuade her fellow panelists to see her 
position as the legally correct one. 
Professor Kim herself is careful to acknowledge that her results 
“do not conclusively establish that strategic behavior explains panel ef-
fects.”15  She readily acknowledges that judges on a panel may be in-
fluenced by nonstrategic, psychological aspects of their interactions 
that result in changes in the “judges’ perceptions and sincere views of 
a case.”16  But she cautions that “[t]hese psychological theories are dif-
ficult to verify empirically because they emphasize processes that are 
internal to individual judges and cannot be observed directly.”17  In 
making this observation, however, Professor Kim falls prey to a pro-
clivity shared by most strategic theorists.  Specifically, Professor Kim 
appears to resolve the issue of behavioral equivalence in favor of a 
strategic account of panel effects, even though that account is no less 
difficult to verify empirically than a deliberative account that focuses 
on nonstrategic, shared cogitation among panel members aimed at 
coming to the most legally sound outcome. 
Two caveats are in order.  First, it is important to emphasize that 
Professor Kim is by no means rigid in her interpretation of the empir-
ical evidence that she provides to support an account of panel effects 
as the product of strategy vis-à-vis the circuit en banc.  She carefully 
explores potential alternative explanations, including the deliberative 
dynamics that may drive panel decisionmaking.18  But, in the end, she 
is inclined toward finding the strategic account to be the best fit for 
the evidence. 
 
15 Id. at 1370. 
16 Id. at 1371. 
17 Id. 
18 See id. at 1371-74 (discussing conformity effects, group polarization, and other 
psychological theories as possible explanations for panel effects in circuit courts). 
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Second, we are not asserting that the evidence presented is a bet-
ter fit for a nonstrategic, deliberative account of panel effects.  Rather, 
the point we wish to make is that the evidence presented is equally 
consistent with both a strategic and a deliberative account of panel ef-
fects.  Further, the deliberative account is no more or less complicated 
than the strategic account.  Stated differently, the strategic account is 
no more parsimonious or elegant than a deliberative account.  Accor-
dingly, there is no basis for favoring a strategic theory over a delibera-
tive theory of panel effects.19 
If we set aside the issue of behavioral equivalence for the moment 
and take the evidence that Professor Kim offers as support for a stra-
tegic account of panel effects, there are two additional points worth 
noting.  The first highlights the limitations of the inferences that can 
be drawn from a study such as Professor Kim’s, which focuses exclu-
sively on Title VII sex discrimination cases.  These cases constitute an 
entirely reasonable and appropriate set of decisions for examining stra-
tegic accounts of judicial behavior, because of their ideological con-
tent.20  Simply put, such cases are likely to bring ideological considera-
tions to the fore, and strategic accounts are, first and foremost, about 
the conditional expression of ideological preferences.  A focus on any 
one substantive type of case, however, means that the generalizability 
of any inferences is circumscribed.  Accordingly, any claims about strateg-
ic accounts of panel effects writ large, based on the analysis of this or any 
other substantive set of cases, should be tempered by this recognition. 
Second, Professor Kim’s finding regarding the Supreme Court’s 
lack of influence over circuit judges’ voting behavior is readily antic-
ipated in the existing literature.  Professor Kim concludes that “the 
increased possibility of review [by the Supreme Court] in the presence 
of a potential dissenter does not appear to influence the panel voting 
behavior of court of appeals judges.”21  She speculates that dissents are 
impotent as threats to trigger Supreme Court review because circuit 
judges do not fear reversal in any meaningful sense.22  In 2003, David 
Klein and Robert Hume published what we think may be the most 
thorough analysis of circuit judges’ fear of reversal existing in the lite-
 
19 We recognize that parsimony as a benchmark for evaluating a scientific theory is 
not universally agreed upon, but it is a benchmark often invoked by strategic theorists 
and, moreover, is consistent with our own epistemological predispositions.  For a use-
ful discussion of parsimony, see, for example, Paul K. MacDonald, Useful Fiction or Mi-
racle Maker:  The Competing Epistemological Foundations of Rational Choice Theory, 97 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 551, 556-57 (2003). 
20 Kim, supra note 4, at 1327 & n.29.  
21 Id. at 1368. 
22 Id. at 1367-68. 
80 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 75 
PENNumbra 
rature.23  Using a well-mined data source on search and seizure deci-
sions compiled by Jeffrey Segal, Klein and Hume sought to measure 
how well the “fear of reversal” explains circuit-court compliance with 
Supreme Court policy pronouncements.24  To do so, they first identi-
fied cases that were the most “cert-worthy” in order to evaluate wheth-
er circuit judges were more likely to defer to Supreme Court prefe-
rences in cases that the Court was likely to review.25  As the authors 
described their approach, “[I]f the desire to avoid [reversal] were a 
major force behind compliance, then deference to a higher court 
would vary with the threat of reversal:  other things remaining equal, 
compliance would be more likely where the probability that a non-
compliant decision would be reversed was higher.”26  Yet the authors 
found no evidence of differential voting behavior between cert-worthy 
and more ordinary cases.27  Although Klein and Hume acknowledged 
that they were also working with a data set in a limited issue area, they 
speculated that the reason that compliance is observed even without 
fear of reversal is related to judges’ efforts to “reach legally sound de-
cisions.”28  Thus, given Klein and Hume’s earlier analysis, we should 
perhaps not be surprised that circuit court judges neither dissent stra-
tegically in order to prompt Supreme Court review29 nor vote counter-
ideologically to avoid it. 
In conclusion, we do not quarrel with the possibility that strategic 
behavior may take place on some circuit courts, in some cases, under 
some conditions.  But our earlier work finding no such effects sug-
gests that the strongest influences on federal appellate courts come 
from the collegial environment in which judges seek consensus to 
promote the efficient administration of justice and to minimize er-
ror.30  Deliberation within the panel over the proper interpretation of 
circuit precedent, as well as compliance with Supreme Court policy, 
 
23 David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court 
Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003). 
24 Id. at 580-81, 586. 
25 Id. at 588-94. 
26 Id. at 600. 
27 See id. at 594 (finding that cert-worthy cases were actually slightly less likely to be 
decided consistently with Supreme Court preferences). 
28 Id. at 602. 
29 HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 2, at 86 (finding “no evidence of strategic [dis-
senting] behavior in cases across the board”). 
30 See id. at 120 (“[A]ppellate judges share the common objective of maximizing 
the number of ‘correct’ decisions with the primary goal of error minimization through 
appellate review.”). 
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furthers these ends.  Thus, although strategic explanations may pro-
vide some measure of insight into circuit judge behavior, the bulk of 
the evidence across multiple issue areas is probably more consistent 
with a form of consensual “team theory” than with rational-choice 
theory.  Having made these observations, we want to reiterate that, 
while the larger literature devoted to strategic decisionmaking takes 
the collegial nature of appellate courts seriously, it does so only very 
narrowly by conceptualizing the multimember court solely as a space 
for strategic calculations by judges.  Professor Kim, in contrast, wishes 
to take seriously the possibility of nonstrategic explanations for panel 
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